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Abstract
Lightness (the perceived dimension running from black to white) represents a problem for vision science because the light
coming to the eye from an object totally fails to specify the shade of gray of the object, due to the confounding of surface gray and
illumination intensity. The two leading approaches, decomposition theories and anchoring theories, split the retinal image into
overlapping layers and adjacent frameworks, respectively. Because each approach has important strengths and some weaknesses,
an integration of them would mark an important step forward for the lightness theory. But the problem remains how this
integration can actually be realized.
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Introduction: The genesis of the lightness
debate
Lightness is the perceived dimension running from black to
white. Surface lightness is a basic property of an object, along
with size and motion. Yet an understanding of how lightness is
computed by the brain is far from complete. The problem is
that because the light coming to the eye from an object de-
pends on both the amount of light the surface reflects
(reflectance) and the intensity of the illumination, it totally
fails to specify the shade of gray of the object. Nevertheless,
surface lightness tends to remain constant even when the illu-
mination changes; this is referred to as lightness constancy.
Modern theories of lightness constancy can be dated to the
late nineteenth century, when a controversy broke out be-
tween, on the one hand, Hering (1878), who supported a
low-level explanation of lightness phenomena based on pro-
cesses sensitive to contrast and, on the other hand, von
Helmholtz (1925), who favored a high-level explanation
based on processes involving unconscious inference.
Helmholtz argued that, in addition to sensing the luminance
of a target surface, the visual system unconsciously estimates
the illumination level and it is the relationship between target
luminance and estimated illumination that predicts the light-
ness percept. Hering argued that Helmholtz’s appeal to cogni-
tion is unnecessary and that low-level processes like adapta-
tion, pupil size, and lateral inhibition can explain the approx-
imate lightness constancy that exists.
David Katz (1935) was the first to study lightness constancy
and its failures systematically. In his most widely emulated
method, subjects were asked to adjust the gray level of a disk
in bright illumination to make it appear equal in lightness to
another disk in shadow. He found both constancy and system-
atic deviations from constancy. The matched level of the two
disks was closer to a reflectance match (100% constancy) than
to a luminance match (0% constancy), although the gray disk in
shadow appeared darker than the disk in brighter illumination.
During the 1920s and 1930s the Gestalt Theorists turned
their attention to lightness perception, making a series of im-
portant contributions. They emphasized the importance of rel-
ative luminance, anticipating Wallach’s (1948) later finding
that two disks of different luminance appear equal in lightness
when they have the same disk/background luminance ratio.
They rejected both Hering’s low-level account and
Helmholtz’s high-level theory, arguing that Hering and
Helmholtz shared the same two-stage approach featuring a
primary stage of raw sensations followed by a second stage
in which those sensations were interpreted based on experi-
ence, and suggesting that such a theory is not falsifiable.
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According to Gelb (1929, excerpted in Ellis, 1938, p. 206):
BThe essentially problematic aspect of the phenomenon has
invariably been taken to be the discrepancy between the ‘stim-
ulus’ and ‘colour’ reaction. Assuming that retinal stimuli and
colour-vision stood in a more or less direct correspondence
with one another, any departure from this primitive and self-
evident relationship – i.e. any ‘discrepancy’ – was explained
on empiristic grounds. Thus, if the discrepancy would not be
rendered comprehensible by reference to ‘physiological’
(peripheral) factors alone, ‘psychological’ factors would also
be invoked. In this way the phenomena of colour constancy
were classified as the product of central processes operating
upon and reorganizing genetically simpler colour-processes."
The Gestaltists put forward the first mid-level theory.
Köhler (1947, p. 103) wrote, BOur view will be that, instead
of reacting to local stimuli by local and mutually independent
events, the organism responds to the pattern of stimuli to
which it is exposed; and that this answer is a unitary process,
a functional whole which gives, in experience, a sensory scene
rather than a mosaic of local sensations. Only from this point
of view can we explain the fact that, with a constant local
stimulus, local experience is found to vary when the surround-
ing stimulation is changed.^
The Gestaltists were well ahead of their time, anticipating
concepts that would come to be seen as important only after
the computer revolution. Katona (1929), Gelb (1929), Wolff
(1933), and Kardos (1934) demonstrated the critical role of
depth perception in lightness. The later enthusiasm for expla-
nations based on lateral inhibition at the retina would be pos-
sible only by neglecting this work (Soranzo, 2015).
Koffka (1935) and Kardos (1934) proposed that fields of
illumination are treated as frames of reference for computing
lightness, providing more concreteness to Helmholtz’s notion
of estimating illumination level. Koffka (1935, p. 245) empha-
sized the crucial role of relative luminance at edges (gradients),
writing BOur theory of whiteness constancy, will be based on
this characteristic of colours, which we found confirmed in so
many passages, that perceived qualities depend upon stimulus
gradients.^ And Koffka made a distinction between luminance
gradients that represent reflectance borders and that represent
illumination borders. Koffka also spoke of a complementary
relationship between lightness and perceived illumination.
Gestalt theory abandoned
At the end of World War II, the center of scientific
work shifted from Europe to the USA, and the Gestalt
contributions were pushed aside. A low-level explana-
tion was particularly in vogue during the 1960s mainly
because of the physiological discovery of the lateral
inhibition process in the limulus (horseshoe crab) retina
(Hartline, Wagner, & Ratliff, 1956). Later, however,
during the so-called cognitive revolution, the low-level
approach was challenged by a series of newfound visual
phenomena directly contradicting a retinal interaction
explanation. Experiments showed that a change in per-
ceived depth could shift the lightness of a target surface
virtually from black to white, with no change in the
retinal image (Adelson, 1993; Gilchrist, 1977, 1980),
or that a dramatic change in the lightness of a target
could be produced merely by causing a (spatially re-
mote) reflectance boundary to appear as an illumination
boundary (Gilchrist et al., 1983).
The discovery of these visual phenomena led to the emer-
gence of several inverse-optics, or decomposition, theories
(Adelson, 1993; Adelson and Pentland, 1996; Arend, 1994;
Bergström, 1977; Barrow & Tenenbaum, 1978; Gilchrist,
1977, 1979; Gilchrist et al. 1983; Land & McCann, 1971;
Marr, 1982), which sought to decompose the retinal image
into components of perceived surface lightness and illumina-
tion that mirror the physical variables of reflectance and illu-
mination that had combined to produce the retinal image in the
first place. These are informally called layer theories.
Later, as the failure of the decomposition theories to ex-
plain lightness illusions (Agostini & Galmonte, 2002;
Agostini & Proffitt, 1993; Bressan & Actis-Grosso, 2001;
Economou et al. 2007; Soranzo & Agostini, 2006a,b) and
failures of lightness constancy (Gilchrist, 1988) became clear,
some theorists abandoned the inverse optics approach and
proposed new, mid-level, so-called framework theories
(Adelson, 2000; Gilchrist et al. 1999) that featured illumina-
tion frames of reference.
Meanwhile low-level approaches based on lateral inhibi-
tion became more sophisticated as they morphed into, for
example, the neural/computational models proposed by
Grossberg and Mingolla (1987), Grossberg and Todorovic
(1988), and Pessoa, Mingolla, and Neumann (1995); or the
spatial filtering models proposed by Blakeslee and McCourt
(2001), Kingdom and Moulden (1992), and Watt and Morgan
(1985). But these, strictly speaking, are models of brightness
(perceived luminance) not lightness (perceived reflectance).
The important problem is how we perceive the properties of
objects (like reflectance), not how we perceive the properties
of the light entering the eye.
Both layer and framework theories attempt to explain sur-
face lightness, and both assume that the retinal image is parsed
into components. But they propose different components. The
debate between these layer and framework theories is the fo-
cus of the present paper.
Decomposition theories
The theories of lightness that arose in the 1970s with the
cognitive revolution generally sought to explain veridicality,
not error, using an inverse optics approach to decompose the
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image into its reflectance and illuminance layers (Adelson,
1993; Adelson & Pentland, 1996; Arend, 1994; Barrow &
Tenenbaum, 1978; Bergström, 1977; Gilchrist, 1977, 1979;
Gilchrist, et al., 1983; Land & McCann, 1971; Marr, 1982).
Unlike the earlier low-level explanations that took absolute
luminance as the input, these theories generally assumed that
only luminance ratios at edges are encoded at the retina.
Gilchrist (1979; Gilchrist & Jacobsen, 1983; Gilchrist, et al.,
1983) and Arend (1994) suggested that luminance ratios at
edges are extracted from the retinal image and classified as
changes in either reflectance or illumination. All the reflec-
tance edges are then integrated to form a map of surface re-
flectance across the visual field and the illumination edges are
integrated to form an additional map of the overlying pattern
of illumination on the scene (Gilchrist, 1979; Gilchrist et al.,
1983). Barrow and Tenenbaum (1978) called these layers in-
trinsic images.
Figure 1 (left, a) represents how the visual system decom-
poses luminance in a bipartite field of illumination according
to the decomposition approaches.
If the layers are parsed successfully, perception is
completely veridical and no errors are predicted. But in that
case the decomposition approach could not explain either fail-
ures of constancy or illusions, such as simultaneous lightness
contrast (gray patch on a white background appears darker
than identical patch on black background). Seeking to accom-
modate these so-called errors, several authors (Gilchrist, 1988;
Ross & Pessoa, 2000; Soranzo & Agostini, 2004; Soranzo
et al. 2009; Soranzo, Lugrin, & Wilson, 2013; Spehar et al.,
2002) proposed the idea of partial classification of luminance
edges. Lightness constancy errors are explained by assuming
that the illumination edges are not fully excluded from the
integration, but partially encoded as reflectance changes.
Ironically, these attempts have been only partially successful.
Other decomposition theories
Other theories have much in common with intrinsic image
theories even if they don’t speak in terms of overlapping
layers. Bergström (1977) proposed that by means of an anal-
ysis into common and relative components, the light
composing the retinal image is decomposed into changes of
reflectance, illumination, and 3D form. Musatti (1953) had
earlier proposed a very similar idea using the now-confusing
terms assimilation and contrast. Adelson and Pentland (1996)
offered a vivid metaphor in which a workshop constructs a
theatre set using workers who paint surfaces, configure light-
ing, and bendmetal, mirroring Bergström’s three components.
Brainard and Maloney (2011) have proposed an equivalent
illumination model, suggesting that constancy fails when the
illumination is misperceived.
Although strictly speaking these theories are not layer the-
ories, they imply that the retinal image is experienced as a
layer of illumination projected onto a layer of surface reflec-
tance. More importantly, they share with the intrinsic image
theories the crucial idea of complementarity between per-
ceived illumination and perceived reflectance, whether or
not there is an error in the attribution of the luminance to the
different components. When a paleontologist cracks open a
layer of rock to reveal a fossil, the two resulting layers of
rock are exactly complementary to each other, even if the
split does not fall exactly along the surface of the fossil.
Likewise, when the visual system splits the luminance, the
two resulting layers of lightness and perceived illumination
are complementary to each other, even if the split does not
correspond exactly to the actual proportions of reflectance and
illumination. This implies that when a higher amount of
luminance is attributed to lightness a complementary smaller
amount of luminance is attributed to illumination. This idea of
Fig. 1 (Left, a): Layer theories split the retinal image into a layer of
perceived illumination projected onto a layer of surface reflectance.
(Right, b): Framework theories parse the retinal image into frameworks
of illumination bounded by corners, occlusion boundaries, and
penumbrae
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complementarity can be found in Koffka (1935; page 244)
who suggested "the possibility that a combination of white-
ness and [perceived illumination], possibly their product, is an
invariant for a given local stimulation under a definite set of
total conditions. If two equal proximal stimulations produce
two surfaces of different whiteness, then these surfaces will
also have different [perceived illuminations], the whiter one
will be less, the blacker one more [brightly illuminated]." (For
clarity we have substituted the term Bperceived illumination^
for Koffka’s term Bbrightness^, which meant perceived illu-
mination then, but currently means perceived luminance.)
Framework approach
Attempting to account for both lightness constancy and its
failures, several theorists have moved away from the inverse
optics logic of the decomposition approach toward theories
that feature frames of reference but are also more rough and
ready. Gilchrist abandoned his inverse optics approach and
proposed a new anchoring theory (Gilchrist et al., 1999;
Gilchrist, 2006). Commenting that Bthe Helmholtzian ap-
proach is overkill^ Adelson (2000, p. 344) also shifted to-
wards a frameworks approach. Similarly, Anderson aban-
doned Metelli's (1974) inverse optics approach in favor of a
mid-level theory of transparency (see, e.g., Anderson &
Khang, 2010).
Anchoring theory
Helmholtz (1925) suggested that in order to compute light-
ness, the illumination level must be taken into account.
However, according to the anchoring theory (Gilchrist,
2006; Gilchrist et al., 1999) the visual system doesn’t need
to know the actual level of illumination – it only needs to
know which surfaces are getting the same amount of illumi-
nation. This translates the problem into one of perceptual
grouping. Multiple surfaces perceived as equally illuminated
can be called illumination groups, and these are products of
both grouping and segmentation processes. For example, in
Gilchrist’s work on depth and lightness, these groups coincide
with perceived planes. Co-planar surfaces can be said to be
grouped by co-planarity or, alternatively, segregated by depth
boundaries. Such groups of equi-illuminated surfaces function
as frames of reference (Duncker, 1938; Koffka, 1935).
The lightness of a given surface is computed relative to its
frame of reference, but not exclusively! Lightness is a weight-
ed average of the lightness computed for a target strictly with-
in its local framework (such as the region within a shadow)
and its lightness computed in relation to the entire (global)
visual field (Gilchrist et al., 1999). This scheme is roughly
equivalent to an earlier proposal by Kardos (1934) called co-
determination, in which lightness is seen partly in relation to
its relevant framework and partly to the foreign framework.
The weighting of local and global values depends primarily on
the number of elements, or articulation level (Katz, 1935), of
the local framework. Within each framework, lightness is an-
chored by assigning white to the highest luminance and eval-
uating every other shade relative to that, using the formula:
Perceived reflectance
¼ target luminance=highest luminance 90%
Bressan (2006) has proposed an alternative version of an-
choring theory called double-anchoring theory, which in-
cludes a surround-as-white rule of anchoring.
Adelson’s (2000) newer approach is based on the concepts
of atmospheres and adaptive windows. An atmosphere is a
region of the visual field sharing the same illumination or glare
or fog. Each adaptive window has its own atmosphere, and
lightness estimates are computed based on the statistics within
the window. The window is adaptive because its size changes
as a function of the number of surfaces in a given area of the
image. The window needs to be large enough so that it includes
a sufficient number of samples. But if the window is too large it
will include samples from different atmospheres. This theory is
similar to the anchoring theory and it gives a great importance
to the number samples in each adaptive window: the window
grows when there are too few samples and shrinks when there
are more than enough. In Gilchrist’s theory, a local framework
coincides with illumination boundaries, while in Adelson’s the-
ory the adaptive window has a soft boundary that doesn’t nec-
essarily coincide with illumination boundaries.
Comparison between the two theories
Layer and framework approaches parse the retinal image in
different ways. While layer theories split the retinal into two
overlapping layer-images, framework theories parse the image
into adjacent regions of differing illumination level. At first
glance, these two ways of decomposing the image appear
incommensurate, even orthogonal. But each theory seems to
offer important insights and this suggests that reconciliation
might be possible.
Figure 1b represents how the visual system parses the scene
into two fields of illumination according to anchoring theo-
ries. As one can see by comparing Fig. 1a and b, the compo-
nents into which the image is decomposed are quite different
for layer and framework theories. In anchoring theories, the
image is segmented into frameworks using illumination
boundaries (cast edges, occlusion edges, and corners) to parse
the image into "contiguous regions of illumination or shadow,
like states on a map" (Gilchrist, 2006; page 331), whereas in
the intrinsic image approach, the image is split into
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complementary overlapping layers, one composed by inte-
grating all the illumination edges, the other composed of all
the reflectance edges.
Consider some crucial strengths and weaknesses of each
approach.
1) The anchoring problem: Both layer and framework theo-
ries emphasize that lightness is associated with relative
luminance. But the problem of how relative luminance
values in the image are transformed into specific lightness
values has been dealt with explicitly only by framework
theories. According to empirical work the highest lumi-
nance is automatically anchored to white (Li & Gilchrist,
1999). In general, decomposition theories have not of-
fered a satisfying solution to the anchoring problem. In
support of a decomposition approach, Kingdom (2011)
and Rudd (2013, 2014) proposed that the highest value
in the reflectance layer, that is the highest lightness, is
anchored to white. Rudd (2014) proposed an alternative
anchoring rule, the highest reflectance anchoring specify-
ing that the Bhighest reflectance in the scene always ap-
pears white, but the highest reflectance may not always be
the same as the highest luminance^ (p. 8). The author
underlined that it is the largest reflectance in the neural
representation, rather than the largest reflectance in the
world, that appears white. However, Gilchrist et al.
(1999) reported a test, shown in Fig. 2, pitting highest
luminance against highest lightness, with results clearly
supporting highest luminance. Due to the presence of the
spotlight, the dark gray target on the left had the highest
luminance in the display and it appeared fully white. The
white target, although it had the highest value in the re-
flectance layer, appeared only light gray.
Zavagno et al. (2004) noted that the phenomenon of self-
luminosity directly contradicts the claim that the highest lumi-
nance appears white. This apparent contradiction has been
resolved by evidence that, in addition to relative luminance,
lightness is anchored by relative area, with a tendency for the
largest area to appear white (Bonato & Gilchrist 1999;
Gilchrist 2006; Li & Gilchrist, 1999). Gilchrist (2006) intro-
duced a distinction between upward and downward induction.
When the luminance difference between a target surface and
its surround increases, and the higher luminance occupies a
much larger area than the lower luminance, the change is
expressed as a darkening of the darker region, with little
change in the lighter region. When the darker region occupies
a much larger area, then an increase in luminance difference is
expressed mainly as a trend towards self-luminosity.
2) The scaling problem. While the anchoring problem con-
cerns which value of relative luminance is tied to which
point on the lightness dimension, the scaling problem
deals with how distances along the luminance scale are
mapped onto distances along the lightness dimension.
Decomposition theories have generally assumed that log
luminance differences map directly onto log lightness dif-
ferences (i.e., log-matched reflectance differences) in a
1:1 fashion. But lightness differences can be either com-
pressed or expanded relative to luminance differences.
Testing a high dynamic range Mondrian, Radonjic, et al.
(2011) found a dramatic compression of the range; a
2,500:1 luminance range was perceived as spanning only
a 30:1 reflectance range. Other work has shown a robust
expansion; Ivory et al. (2011) found that a 5:1 luminance
range Mondrian was perceived as spanning almost a 30:1
reflectance range. This is attributed by anchoring theory
to scale normalization, a tendency to perceive the canon-
ical range from white to black (30:1) within a framework.
Expansion and compression of the gamut has not been
addressed, and is not easily accommodated by decompo-
sition theories.
In 1995, Cataliotti and Gilchrist reported a dramatic new
illusion dubbed the staircase Gelb effect. A row of five squares
ranging from black to white was suspended in mid-air and
illuminated by a bright spotlight. Not only did this arrange-
ment produce a huge failure of constancy, with the black
square appearing light gray, but more importantly, it intro-
duced a strong compression of perceived reflectances relative
to actual (see Fig. 3). In this case the compression cannot be
attributed to scale normalization because it goes in the oppo-
site direction.
Gamut compression in the staircase Gelb illusion poses a
challenge to layer theories because the lightness of each
square is shifted upward by a different amount. An error in
decomposition – for example, if a portion of an illumination
edge were erroneously classified as a reflectance change or if
some portion of the common component were erroneously
attributed to surface reflectance – would produce an offset in
lightness values, rather than compression. In the spotlight, all
Fig. 2 In this display (Gilchrist et al., 1999; p. 828) the dark gray target is
the highest luminance in the display, and it appears lighter than the white
target, which would be the highest value in the reflectance layer
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reflectances should appear to be lightened by the same
amount, but not compressed. Gamut compression is associat-
ed with the juxtaposition of two fields with differing levels of
illumination, especially when one of the fields is smaller in
area and/or is surrounded by the other. An analogous sort of
gamut compression is found in a shadowed area, except that
the compression is downward: high reflectances in shadow
deviate from constancy more than low reflectances (Ivory &
Gilchrist, 2010).
According to anchoring theory, the compression stems
from what Kardos (1934) called co-determination; the light-
ness of a surface is not determined exclusively within its own
framework of illumination but is partially anchored relative to
the adjacent or surrounding field of illumination. Gilchrist and
colleagues (Gilchrist et al., 1999) have argued that, although
each of the five shades is computed veridically within the
spotlight, they are all computed to be white relative to the
surrounding dimmer illumination. The compression is held
to result from the averaging of these equal lightness values
together with their veridical values.
However, recent data from the Gilchrist lab has
contradicted a prediction based on this account. When spot-
light intensity is increased beyond 30 times the room level, no
further compression should occur. With all shades computed
as white relative to the global anchor, the source of compres-
sion is maxed out. However, experiments have shown
(Gilchrist & Ivory, 2013) that the compression continues to
increase as the spotlight intensity is increased beyond 30 times
the room level, but that the degree of gamut compression is
predicted by the luminance ratio between the highest lumi-
nance in the spotlight and the highest luminance in the sur-
rounding field of illumination. This finding supports the gen-
eral idea of co-determination while rejecting the particular
mechanism proposed in the original version of anchoring the-
ory (Gilchrist et al., 1999).
It has been argued (Allred & Brainard, 2013; Bloj et al.,
2004) that gamut compression can be accommodated within
the decomposition approach by assuming the perception of a
different level of illumination on each patch within the shad-
ow. But this construction defies the intuitive concept of illu-
mination as dispersed across multiple surfaces.
3) Role of articulation. One of the most powerful factors in
lightness is articulation, which refers to the number of
distinct patches within a field of illumination. In their
early work, Katz (1935) and Burzlaff (1931) found poor
constancy when subjects matched a disk in bright illumi-
nation to a disk in an adjacent field in shadow. But they
found almost perfect constancy when each field contained
a tableau of 48 patches. Although this fact was forgotten
during much of the prior century, many experiments in
recent decades have confirmed it (Agostini & Galmonte,
1999; Arend & Goldstein, 1987; Cataliotti & Gilchrist,
1995; Schirillo & Arend, 1995). This is easily accommo-
dated by the anchoring theory, with articulation level de-
termining the weight of each competing framework in the
co-determination process. But it is difficult to see how the
role of articulation can be accommodated by a layer ap-
proach. In Gilchrist’s intrinsic image theory, for example,
the degree of constancy found between adjacent fields of
illumination should depend simply on how veridically the
illumination edge between them is encoded and classi-
fied. The number of distinct patches within each field
should play no role.
4) Area effects. Katz (1935) also found that the degree of
constancy is influenced by the size of the field of illumi-
nation; hence his laws of field size. Such effects make
sense within a framework approach because the area of
a field influences the weight of that field in the co-
determination process. But, just as with articulation ef-
fects, area effects do not seem commensurate with layer
theories.
Layer theories are associated with the idea of inverse op-
tics. So, for example, when a shadow falling across a scene
introduces a luminance step into the image, that step is clas-
sified as a change of illumination, and excluded from the
reflectance map. In other words, the confounding of illumina-
tion and reflectance in the formation of the image is inverted
by edge classification. But effects of articulation and area have
no counterpart in image formation. They do not function to
invert or disentangle confounded variables. For example, if
surfaces in the real world reflected more light as they become
larger in area, then the effect of area on lightness would be
consistent with a decomposition approach. But that is not the
way the world works.
5) Transparency and veiling luminance. Obviously, percep-
tion of opaque surfaces seen through a transparent layer
favors a layer decomposition approach because the scene
contains spatially separated layers. Indeed, Metelli’s
Fig. 3 Staircase Gelb illusion. When a series of squares, ranging from
black to white, is suspended in mid-air and illuminated by a spotlight, the
perceived shades of gray are dramatically compressed relative to their
actual shades
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(1975) work on transparency was an early and explicit
inverse optics approach, with perceptual color scission
the inverse of color fusion. The transparent surfaces he
studied include both a filter and a veil component. But a
veiling luminance can occur without a filter component,
as when looking through a sheet of light reflected in a
window. Glare also constitutes a veiling luminance in
the eye. When a veiling luminance is superimposed on a
scene, both luminance values and luminance ratios are
altered. Nevertheless, empirical results show an impres-
sively high degree of lightness constancy through a veil-
ing luminance (Gilchrist & Jacobsen, 1983). Both layer
and framework theories work well for the filter compo-
nent, like the shadow it mimics (Metelli, 1974, 1975), but
the veil component is better handled by a layer theory.
6) Black rooms and white rooms. Gilchrist and Jacobsen
(1983) obtained lightness matches for two miniature
rooms filled with abstract 3D objects. One was painted
entirely black, including the contents, and the other was
painted entirely white. The white room was perceived as
completely white, while the black room was perceived as
a middle gray, a result that is more consistent with a layer
theory than a framework theory. Because all of the lumi-
nance edges were either gradual or, when sharp, coinci-
dental with a change of planarity, they were perceptually
attributed to the illumination. Presumably the removal of
these edges from the image leaves only a homogeneous
reflectance layer. But the specific lightness value of that
layer is not specified. The same challenge applies to
shape-from-shading. Algorithms exist that transform the
luminance variations across the image of a sculpture into
a specific three-dimensional shape with homogeneous
lightness (Horn, 1975, 1977; Pentland, 1989). But they
do not specify that lightness value.
Perception in a three-dimensional world of one reflectance
poses a challenge for a framework theory as there are no obvious
frameworks. One could treat each plane as a framework but such
a framework would have the minimum articulation level of one.
Gilchrist and Jacobsen (1983) showed that the luminance
variations across the white room and the black room were
qualitatively the same, but with much greater amplitude (i.e.,
high contrast) in the black room. Recent work by Gilchrist and
Ivory (2011) further isolated this factor. They found that re-
ducing the variation amplitude by covering a black room with
a veiling luminance makes it appear as a white room.
But why does the black room (without the veil) appear
middle gray rather than black? Could this appearance be the
result of a compromise between the highest luminance rule of
anchoring (indicating a white room) and the high-contrast
luminance variations (indicating a black room)? This would
be consistent with the spirit of compromise in the anchoring
theory, but without the competing frameworks.
Adelson (2000, p. 346) has observed that X-junctions that
emerge where the edge of a veiling luminance intersects a
more distant reflectance edge creates the impression of a haze
or veil. Although Anderson and his co-authors (Anderson,
Singh, & Meng, 2006; Anderson & Winawer, 2005, 2008;
Anderson, 1999, 2003) are leading proponents of layer theo-
ries, they have proposed a Transmittance Anchoring Principle
(TAP), for discovering what part of a scene is covered by a
veiling luminance. TAP states that the Bvisual system treats
the highest contrast image regions as regions in plain view and
only infers the presence of transparent surfaces if there are
spatial or spatio-temporal perturbations in the contrast magni-
tude along contours, surfaces, or textures^ (Anderson &
Winawer, 2008; page 5).
What are the possibilities for integrating layer
and framework approaches?
Phenomenology offers important guidance but does not seem
to resolve our dilemma. We do seem to perceive a layer of
illumination projected onto a layer of surface reflectance. But
we also experience frameworks of illumination. This suggests
that an integration of the two kinds of theory is possible.
There is no contradiction between layers and frame-
works, but rather between layer theories and framework
theories. It can be said that layer and framework theories
parse the retinal image into different components, i.e.,
layers and frameworks. But this is a bit misleading. For
framework theories, the process begins with segregation
of the image into frameworks. But for layer theories, the
reflectance and illuminance layers represent the end of the
process, not the beginning. Layer theories begin with edge
encoding and edge classification (Gilchrist et al., 1983). Of
course, edge classification and framework segregation are
very closely related. If you know where the illumination
edges are, you know where the frameworks are.
Both layer and framework approaches have a gestalt flavor.
Both accept relative luminance as an input. Neither approach
is structure-blind. Both find support in Koffka (1935; see also
Gilchrist, 2006, pp. 371-373). The concept of frames of refer-
ence was central to Koffka’s thinking, which is most clearly
revealed in his analysis of motion perception. But he also
treated different regions of illumination as frameworks. Like
Kardos (1934), Koffka did not consider the lightness value of
a target to be exclusively computed within its own framework,
but recognized that values within one framework are distorted
by the presence of adjacent or surrounding frameworks. This
can be seen in his remark that "a field part x is determined in
its appearance by its 'appurtenance’ to other field parts. The
more x belongs to the field part y, the more will its whiteness
be determined by the gradient xy, and the less it belongs to
the part z, the less will its whiteness depend on the gradient
xz" (page 246).
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This graded account of belongingness is consistent with the
idea of co-determination (Kardos Gilchrist), whereas layer the-
ories seem to require more of an all-or-none kind of belonging-
ness in which a target belongs exclusively to one framework or
another. At the same time, Koffka’s lightness/perceived illumi-
nation invariance theorem, according to which a combination
of lightness and perceived illumination is invariant for a surface
of constant luminance, seems equivalent to the complementar-
ity implicit in the decomposition approach.
Empirical results have shown that both lightness (Li &
Gilchrist, 1999) and perceived illumination (Gilchrist &
Soranzo, under review; Kozaki 1965, 1973; Oyama, 1968)
are anchored by highest luminance. Although this work was
done primarily in the context of framework theories, these
results imply the complementarity layer theories and
Koffka’s theorem. Consider a group of patches, such as a
Mondrian array. When a higher maximum luminance is added
to the array, two things happen. First, the lightness of a given
patch in the Mondrian goes down. Second, the perceived illu-
mination on the Mondrian goes up. And as long as the
Mondrian is well articulated, these upward and downward
shifts are equal in magnitude. However, in the staircase Gelb
illusion, with its relatively weak articulation, errors in light-
ness and perceived illumination are not equal and opposite.
Gamut compression implies that the lightness error is different
for each square in the staircase. Thus, any error in perceived
illumination could be equal and opposite to, at most, the light-
ness error for a single square.
Conclusions
From what we outlined above, it seems clear that both the
decomposition and framework approaches to lightness per-
ception have their pro and cons.
Layer theories do not have an adequate account of the
anchoring problem. They cannot account for scaling effects,
such as gamut expansion when viewing a low dynamic range
Mondrian, gamut compression when viewing a high dynamic
range Mondrian, or gamut compression in the staircase Gelb
illusion. And they fail to capture lightness changes that occur
due to an increase or decrease in the number of visible patches
within a field of illumination. Framework theories have been
quite successful in accounting for these effects.
On the other hand, framework theories cannot account for
lightness constancy through a veiling luminance, although
intuition suggests that this is a version of the scaling problem.
Layer theories easily accommodate the experience of seeing a
veil layer in front of an opaque surface layer, but they do not
specify how the presence of the veil is detected and how the
intensity of the veil is computed. Framework theories have so
far said very little about perception of the illumination level,
beyond the important finding that perceived illumination level
is signaled by highest luminance (Kozaki 1965, 1973; Oyama,
1968). One concept central to both layer and framework the-
ories is that of illumination edges. In layer theories, illumina-
tion edges are separated from reflectance edges while in
framework theories, illumination edges form the boundaries
of frameworks.
It seems that a new, more comprehensive theory is needed
that is capable of integrating the two approaches. However,
because the units into which the retinal image is split, layers
versus frameworks, are so different, it is difficult to see how
the two approaches can be integrated.
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